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Abstract 
In most European countries Social Security (SS) systems are characterized as Pay-as-
you-go systems. Their sustainability is being challenged with demographic changes, 
namely population ageing. Portugal’s population is ageing rapidly being one of the 
countries where this problem is more critical. With the growing debate on this topic 
several public choice models have been developed so as to explain SS size. In this 
work project there is an attempt to understand whether these models contribute to 
better explain Social security expenditure with pensions (SSEP) and to establish the 
need of finding ways to reduce present commitment with pension expenditure in 
Portugal.  
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1. Purpose of the Project 
Retirement is a relatively recent concept. In 1883 German Chancellor Otto Von 
Bismarck implemented the first welfare state in the World, as a response to the rise of 
new political ideologies (socialism) in Europe. The initial retirement age was 70 and 
was revised to 65 in 1916. Pensions were adopted all over the world not only as a 
political need but also as a social one: the few people that would live until 65 would 
have severe difficulties in working and would not be able to sustain themselves.  
The retirement age was maintained for almost a century but population and social 
structures changed considerably, leaving several European systems in distress.  
Portugal is no exception, as the system in place is the Pay-as-You-Go-System 
(Paygo), that is highly affected by demographic changes. 
The Portuguese elderly population increased every year more than younger 
population since 77. Also one should note that it has never decreased in this period, 
unlike younger population. This can be observed in the first Graph. Furthermore it has 
direct influence on the ratio of population in working age over population above 65. 
On Graph 2 shows the decline of this ratio since 71. In 40 years this number has 
decreased from 6,4 to 3,4. If one considers the OECD Population estimates, there will 
be a further fall, reaching 1.75 in 2060, roughly half of 2011 values; this means that 
for each person in retirement age there would be less than 2 in working age. 
  
Graph 1: Population annual variation              Graph 2: Population above 65 over working aged population 
Source: PORDATA and author calculations 
The Paygo system so widely spread in Europe must suffer some changes in the close 
future. Portugal’s retirement age will increase next year to 66 and should reach 67 in 
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2029. Also, some sustainability components were added to the pension calculation. 
Nevertheless there is a rapid upward trend in population ageing and hence these 
measures only postpone the inevitable Social Security Deficit. This was made clear by 
the government proposal. 
Several public choices models have been made in order to understand the size of 
social security systems in the western world. The scope of this project is to debate 
some of these hypotheses and try to study their implications in a time series 
methodology so as to understand which one better fits in the Portuguese framework. 
To do so, the SS system is first introduced, followed by the Literature Review and 
Competing Hypothesis presentation on section 3. Then variables will be studied on 
section 4 and theories will be tested on 5. Finally, section 6 concludes de project.  
2. Social Security Framework 
2.1 – Three pillars of Pensions 
Pension systems are divided in several different ways regarding the sources of 
pensions. Traditionally they are divided into three different pillars: 
1) Public Pensions refer to the public mandatory system. The coverage of this 
system varies from country to country and can range from the sole protection of 
workers to the protection of all citizens. Alternatively one can define the first 
pillar as non-contributory or basic pension having the sole purpose of 
guarantying a minimum income.  
2) Occupational Pensions that encompasses an individual complementary 
protection to worker groups and pension funds. Furthermore it can be defined as 
the compulsory savings contributory pillar instead.  
3) Personal pensions that refers to individual savings for retirement purposes. 
This in Portugal includes Retirement Savings Plans (PPR’s). According to the 
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World Bank Averting the Old Age Crisis Report this can be called the voluntary 
savings contributory pillar.  
In Portugal the thickest pillar is the second, as most retirements are occupational: 
Only one third of the beneficiaries have a disability or survival pension. The third 
pillar, that is own savings, has still small representation.   
2.2 - Pay as you go Systems 
Portugal’s System can be defined as a Pay-as-you-go system (Paygo). Traditionally 
run by the government, Paygo are based on the fact that it is possible to tax current 
workers in order to ensure pensions for last generation workers. In a Legislative 
perspective there is a contract between the system and the worker assuring the second 
that if he pays contributions today he will receive a retirement pension in the future. 
From a macroeconomic perspective there is a simple transfer of revenues from one 
group to another. Nonetheless the objective is clear: intergenerational redistribution 
that result in risk sharing across generations.  
Following Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966) one can say that Social Security 
Paygo can increase welfare if the population growth rate summed by the productivity 
growth rate is higher than the real interest rate. 
2.3 - Political evolution of the system 
Currently, besides a lower bound of roughly 200 euros per month, the calculus to 
determine pension benefit value is a function of the number of years of work, the 
average wage of the last 10 years of working life, the retirement age and inflation. All 
these factors influence positively the amount received. Moreover other factors 
influence how generous benefits actually are: Eligibility for example.  
There have been several policy changes that have affected Social Security 
Expenditure with Pensions (SSEP) or SS revenues either by changing benefits or 
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contributions calculations or by changing entitlement to these benefits. It is important, 
for the purpose of this analysis, to understand these structural changes on Social 
Security policy. To do so major changes that impact directly on pension system and 
distribution are listed as follows: 
In 1974, as a result of great political changes in Portugal, a more socially protective 
policy was implemented in the context of Social Security. Not only pensions 
eligibility was widened to include pensions for disabled people for example, but also 
the unemployment subsidy was created. This change is highlighted by the 1976 
constitutionalization of the right to Social Security. This can be seen as a first attempt 
to further establish the first pillar of SS.  
In 1980 a non-contributory regime of social protection, for poorer citizens was 
created. Six years later the TSU (single social tax) was created. Furthermore farmers 
were also included in the pension general scheme. In 88 the unified pension regime 
was established. Then, in the early 90’s legal changes on pension funds were made 
and pre retirement regime was instituted. The 93 political reform promoted big 
changes to pension calculations for both old age and disability pensions. Also a social 
complement, without contributory basis was created. In 96 the minimum guaranteed 
income was created for the non-contributive regime, together with a social inclusion 
program. The fundamental objectives of SS reform were established in 2000, these 
were: the improvement of social security protection levels, guarantying financial 
sustainability of SS system and management efficiency improvement. Changing 
pension calculation and SS financing sources would fulfill these objectives.  
In 2003 the new SS basis Law went in to action, which led to a change in the system 
architecture. There was a division of three main systems within the SS framework: the 
public system, the social action system and complementary system. Furthermore 
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calculations of several pensions, subsidies and complements were changed. 2007 
amendment created some incentives to prevent early retirement as a sustainability 
factor was added to the calculus, reducing in this way pension benefits when people 
work fewer years. Other smaller changes were made to pension benefits calculations.  
Finally, in 2012, further rules were implemented to decrease the incidence of early 
retirement. In the past year there were several retirement benefits reductions: Current 
economic crisis is resulting in massive cuts in all social spending. Nevertheless, not 
only there are social constraints to reduce benefits but also there are several legal 
constraints. Even though Portugal is currently experiencing a difficult economic time, 
and Troika is being used as a scapegoat, these changes are being made against public 
opinion. 
2.4. Social Security Pension systems in Portugal development 
In a Paygo system there is a direct interaction between expenditures with pensions 
and contributions. However SS Revenues (SSR) are not completely explained by 
contributions, actually there are several other income sources. Currently, revenues 
other than contributions surpass 60% of SSR. Two of the main sources are depicted in 
the following chart. The 
weight of Current transfers, 
Capital Revenues and 
Capital Transfers on SSR 
are represented in blue and 
should be read using the 
secondary axis.    Graph 3: SSR Structure; Source: Pordata 
Revenues have been increasing considerably but so is SS expenditure, both with 
pensions and other subsidies such as unemployment benefits. The chart on the left 
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shows total expenditure and revenues together with Contributions and SSEP. Both 
pairs have followed a similar path and it was only in 2009 that SSEP surpassed 
contributions, however this was amended in 2012 with the significant decrease of 
pension expenditure resultant on major cuts in pension benefits. 
One can say that contributions are a 
function of number of workers, average 
gains and tax rate. Number of workers 
is expected to decrease considerably in 
the future, actually in light of OECD 
estimated working age population will decrease roughly 16% from 2010 to 2060. 
Furthermore a 57% increase in population over 65 is expected from 2010 to 2060. 
Substantial productivity gains together with increasing tax and employment rates are 
necessary to offset this tendency let alone follow the growing tendency of pension 
expenditure. 
3. Literature review – Competing Hypothesis   
There are several theoretical public choice models that try to explain social security 
size. Lindert (1996) divided these public choice theories into 6 main hypotheses: 
deadweight costs, bureaucratic momentum, electoral variables, age distribution, 
income level and income asymmetry. Here the focus will be set on the last three 
hypotheses.  
The age distribution of the adult population is probably one of the main influences on 
retirement welfare programs size. Demographic changes are the most crucial factor 
that have been endangering Pay-as-you-go systems in Europe: the increase of the 
number of beneficiaries, ceteris paribus, will lead to an increase of SS size.  
Graph 4: SS Expenditure and Revenues; Source: Pordata 
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It is important to note however that what happens to the generosity of the system is 
not transparent. On one hand in an ageing population the number of pensions granted 
in a system like the Portuguese is bound to increase, augmenting in this way the 
bargaining power of elderly people, but on the other hand the number of contributors 
will decrease increasing the burden with pensions.  
As an attempt to understand this, John Turner’s (2001) model of intergenerational 
transfers shows that the old age and youth dependency ratios can be seen as shadow 
prices of social security pensions transfers and intergenerational transfers to the young 
respectively. Bearing this in mind he believes that ageing population will lead to an 
increase in overall pension expenditure but benefits will decrease relative to earnings. 
This is because political power gained by increasing elderly population is offset by 
the increase in the shadow price of benefits.   
Income growth has been associated not only with the increase of SSEP but also in its 
share of National income. In Portugal in the last 40 years it has increased from less 
than 1% to almost 8%. Nevertheless the underlying reason for this to happen has still 
to reach a consensus. Lindert describes it as the “most durable black box in the whole 
rise-of-the-state literature” and thus it should not be included formally as a public 
choice theory. Consequently, this statistical relationship will not be studied as a 
hypothesis but as an attempt to understand its genesis. 
Income distribution theory departs from the fact that inequality has been related with 
higher preference for redistribution and therefore taxation. The theoretical reason 
underlying this hypothesis is that the median voter would prefer more taxation the 
poorer he is in relation to the average income. Tabellini (1990) developed the first 
model that explores this idea, defending that the political support of current social 
security programs are due to the fact that they redistributes both across and within 
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generations. If this is true then some policies such as SS privatization would imply 
greater costs than the ones analysed, as privatization would considerably decrease 
redistribution.  
However, recent studies have shown that intragenerational redistribution has been 
decreasing over the last 20 years. Krieger and Traub (2008) study this hypothesis 
empirically using the Bismarckian factor1. Even though statistical evidence is weak, it 
was observed for the past 15 years an increase of both the Bismarckian factor and the 
generosity of the pension system. 
Borck (2007) noted that if life expectancy is correlated positively with income then it 
is possible that policies designed to be progressive could even be regressive, “if the 
longer life expectancy [of higher income population] more than outweighs the higher 
contributions”. Therefore, if we truly have redistribution, income inequality would 
lead to higher pension levels. 
It is of interest to mention electoral variables hypothesis as it is reasonable to assume 
that political agenda has a great influence on welfare spending. In fact what really 
determines the benefits amount and pensions eligibility is policy making. As 
governments design benefits the increase of social spending is normally associated to 
a political agenda. Some theoretical attempts to study political agenda impact on SS 
expenditure have been made. Most of these efforts are translated in voting models that 
generally assume that voters are selfish.   
In a general equilibrium framework Cooley and Soares developed a voting model to 
study the political possibility of Privatizing Social Security (1999). Not only the short 
run financing problem, but also the fact that the Paygo system is politically robust 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “The Bismarckian factor divides the pension benefit into a flat component (such as a basic or minimum pension) 
and into an earnings-related component: the higher the Bismarckian factor, the more important is the earnings-
related part and, thus, the smaller is the degree of intragenerational redistribution.” Empirically it is the “ratio of 
the income share of public pensions in the bottom quintile to the same share in the top quintile” Krieger and Traub, 
2008 
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makes it hard to change. They attempt to design a transition phase that maximizes 
political support in a general equilibrium framework. All policies that would be 
feasible include a great increase of public debt.  
There have been made several empirical studies that attempt to explain SSEP. To 
understand which series were used in the literature the table that follows summarizes 
these models that study social security expenditure. Next to the independent variables 
there is an indication2 of their effect on the bold dependent variable.  
Dependent variables Independent variables 
  Income inequality Demographic  
Economic; Political; 
Others 
Tabellini Top 20% over 
Low 40% inc.(+) 
Proportion of 65+ in 
total population (+) 
  
Welfare+SS 
expenditures   
Breyer and Craig       
SS contributions % GNP Gini coefficient (?)  
Ratio (40-60) over 
(65+)(-) L-run real interest rate(-) 
Benefits as % GNP   Median age(+)  L-run real growth rate (+) 
Pensions (government) % 
GNP   
Portion households 
1–4(+) Inflation rate (+) 
Ben. p/person60+% GNP     Log Real GNP pc (?)  
Lindert   
 
  
All gov. expenditure ln(up. inc. gap) (+) School-agers (+)  ln(Gdp per adult 20-64) (-) 
Non-social expenditure ln(low. inc. gap)(-) Young adults (+)  Voter turnout (+) 
All social expenditure Inc. inequality= 
ln(up)+ln(lower)(-) 




Other 4 Social exp. 
Income skewness 
= ln(up)-ln(lower) (+) 
    
Unemployment 
expenditure     
Education expenditure       
Health expenditure       
Turner    Old dependency(+) Earnings (dual effect)  
Average pension 
Benefit   Youth depend. (+) SS coverage ratio (-) 
Both in log(**) and not   Working pop(+) Benefit Eligibility (+) 
    
Labour force part. 
Rate (-) Benefit acceptance (+) 
    Employment rate (+)   
    Old age pop (65+) (+)   
    Youth Pop (+)   
Krieger and Traub    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 (+) or (-) if the variable has a positive or negative impact respectively. (?) Denotes the cases in which 
the effect is not clear. 
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Bismarckian factor  Inc. Skewness(-) Life expectancy(+) Mean income(-) 
Generosity index 
 
Household Size(+) Inc. Coef. of Variation(-) 
José Correia   Beneficiaries (+) GDP (+) 
SSEP    Population (+) Social Contributions (+) 
Table 1: Summary of SS expenditure explanation models in the Literature 
4 – Stationary Analysis: The Fourier Transformation Model  
The first step to study time series variables empirically is to determine if they are 
stationary or not. Note that, as most of SS variables are subject to structural shocks 
applying standard linear tests can lead to biased results. The introduction of dummy 
variables to test stationarity is tempting but it raises big issues. Although one can pin 
point most of these shocks, their inclusion would result in a problem of pre-selection. 
Furthermore Dummies will account for a sudden break, and therefore will not fit 
properly in most data and would result in power loss, something to be avoided when 
we have so many shocks and so little data.  
An alternative to simple linear model is to use a Fourier function. This, according to 
both Enders and Lee and Becker et al. is able to mimic a large variety of breaks in the 
trend function. Also note that it is possible to introduce a more general Fourier form, 
but this may lead to over fitting issues, and power losses.   
In a linear framework, so as to perform both Dickey Fuller test and the Augmented 
DF, one should run the regressions:  
1) ΔYt = θ + αyt-1 + βΔyt-1 + δt 
2) ΔYt = θ + αyt-1 + βΔyt-1  
On a first approach both these tests were performed for all studied variables. To 
choose the Lags on the ADF test partial autocorrelation (pac) and information criteria 
were used. In annex it is possible to observe test results, AC, PAC graphs and 
Information Criteria tables.  
When including the non-linear framework the regressions to be run are as follows:  
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3) Yt= θ0 + β0yt-1 + δt + α1sen(2kπt/T) + α2cos(2kπt/T), t=1, 2,…, T  
4) Yt= β0yt-1 + α1sen(2kπt/T) + α2cos(2kπt/T), t=1, 2,…, T  
Where T is the sample size and K is a parameter that denotes frequency. K should be 
estimated for each variable to be studied and then fixed. To do this one should first 
run equations 3) and 4) by setting β0=0 for each possible 5 k’s. Then the value of k 
that provides a better fit for the variable should be set. Note that when the frequency 
gets bigger the breaks will be occurring really often. 
After choosing the appropriate K, for both equations, equations 3 and 4 were 
regressed, followed by testing it as suggested by Enders and Lee. A normal t statistic 
is performed to test the null hypothesis Ho: β0=1 against the alternative H1: |β0|<13. 
Enders and Lee Critical values can be found in Annex, together with the regression 
tables of the estimated equations. 
4.1 - Contributions  
After performing ADF tests it was concluded that contributions is a unit root. To 
further test this variable a Fourier transformation was performed. The first step was to 
choose the appropriate frequency. In the following table, adjusted R-squared values 
can be observed for different values of K. K was set as 1.  
 K=1 K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 
R2 W. trend 0.9869 0.9854 0.9834 0.9857 0.9796 
R2 W/out trend 0.8780 0.0583 0.0004 0.0063 0.0253 
Table 2: Frequency determination   
Then the test was performed. Results are as follows: 
Average Benefits Test Statistic 1% 5% 10% Conclusion 
No trend -0,09 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Trend -3,365 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Table 3: Tests statistics and critical values for the DF test of the Fourier transformation equations 
The variable is a unit root process. This means that a shock, either positive or 
negative, will have long lasting effects on contributions. For this variable shocks can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Test Statistic=(β0-1)/Se(β0) 
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have a number of different sources, such as the ones pinpointed above: number of 
workers, average gains and SS tax rate (TSU). 
4.2 – Social Security Expenditure with Pensions 
Pension expenditure is influenced by two main factors: the number of pension 
beneficiaries and average pension benefits, (APB4). As stated before the number of 
beneficiaries is expected to increase considerably which stresses the need to increase 
revenues or decrease average benefits.  
The following chart represents in red real expenditure with pensions and in blue real 
average pensions times the number of beneficiaries.  
 
Graph 5: APB times beneficiaries and Expenditure with pensions 
After performing ADF tests it was concluded that SSEP is integrated of order 2 (see 
in annex). In order to have a meaningful analysis of this variable as a hole, it is of 
interest to study each component that characterize it individually.  
Number of beneficiaries is a demographic variable that theoretically should be 
characterized as a unit root (retired people would be explained by retired people in the 
last period almost perfectly). ADF tests confirmed it, but it will be further debated in 
the segment “age distribution theory”.  
4.2.1 – Real Average Pension Benefits 
In the event that real benefits would present a somewhat stable behaviour, changes in 
SSEP would be explained simply by changes in the number of beneficiaries, that is, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this Work Project all monetary value variables are treated in real terms discounted with 2006 GDP 
deflator. Although some variables would make sense to be discounted by the CPI, the deflator was used 
always, so as to have a coherent analysis overall. 
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demographic changes. But in fact in the last 40 years there has been a considerable 
increase on real average retirement benefits.  
Considering this chart, it is quite 
straightforward to assume that one 
should take into account other 
public choice theories other than 
Graph 6: Real APB; Source: Pordata and author calculations  age distribution to explain SSEP: 
It is not only the number of beneficiaries that affect Expenditure with Pensions.  
Again a stationarity analysis was performed and in all tests (ADF) average pension 
benefits failed to reject the null of non-stationarity. This was followed by the Fourier 
transformation analysis. First the K was set as 1:  
 K=1 K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 
R2 W. trend 0.9876 0,9622 0,9567 0,9605 0,9567 
R2 W/out trend 0.7007 0.0987 0.0714 0.0282 0.0225 
Table 4: Frequency determination   
Then the regression tables and test statistics were run. The following table presents 
the results: 
Average Benefits Test Statistic 1% 5% 10% Conclusion 
No trend -0,133 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Trend -3,602 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Table 5: Tests statistics and critical values for the DF test of the Fourier transformation equations 
This means that a shock on average pension benefits will not fade away, having in 
this way long lasting consequences. It is therefore of outmost importance to 
understand what can translate in changes on APB. Given data limitations, testing 
simultaneously all public choice theories would lead to serious power losses. For this 
reason each theory will be studied individually. 
5 – Public choice hypothesis  
5.1 – Age distribution theory 
The importance of age distribution in SSEP is so straightforward there is no need to 
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linger too much in explanations: Everything else constant, the increase of pension 
beneficiaries will lead inevitably to an increase in pension expenditure. This would 
not be problematic, if young population would also increase so as to maintain a 
similar age distribution or productivity rises considerably. The only policy instrument 
to affect this number directly is to change the legal retirement age. Nevertheless it is 
possible to change it indirectly with fiscal incentives to work longer for example. 
Other analysis of interest is the effect of number of beneficiaries on average benefits. 
Actually, in light of Turner’s model, benefits should decrease relative to earnings. To 
understand this relationship a chart representing old age dependency ratio and average 
benefits over average income is presented below:  
Benefits have been increasing relative to 
earnings since 85 opposing Turner’s theory. 
Still, this can merely indicate that old 
dependency ratio is still not high enough for  
this relationship to be of political significance, 
that is, the benefit’s shadow price is still not high enough to offset the elderly 
bargaining power gain. Therefore no conclusion can be drawn on Turner’s theory 
from this analysis, although one can state that, at this point, there is no evidence to 
support it.   
5.2 – Income growth “theory” 
Even though income growth should not be labeled as a “theory” it is of interest to 
understand the genesis of this relationship and if it is causal. To properly study this, it 
is important to analyse carefully the implications of each variable that can explain the 
evolution of pension expenditure when compared to income growth. In this project 
the focus will lay on two ratios: SS pensions spending over GDP and Average 
Graph 7: Ratio Benefits/earnings and dependency 
ratio; Source: Pordata and Author Calculations  
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pension benefits (APB) over GDP per capita. In addition, also the comparison 
between APB to average income will be analysed.    
SSEP as a percentage of GDP has grown considerably in the past 42 years. As stated 
before, the underlying reasons for this phenomena, (observed all over the world), are 
yet to be determined. Although the overall expenditure when compared to GDP has 
been increasing, the fact is benefits have been increasing in a somewhat proportional 
fashion to GDP per capita. The chart on the right represents the ratio APB over GDP 
per capita. It has been fairly constant, especially since the late 70’s.  
 
Graph 8: SSEP/GDP           Graph 9: Benefits/GDP per capita 
Source: Pordata and author calculations 
The main difference on these indicators is of course age distribution. Population 
increased considerably in the last 4 decades but old age pensioners increased more 
than proportionally. Furthermore although benefits increased proportionally to GDP 
per capita, beneficiaries increased in number and in percentage of total population.  
Another important comparison to be made is about average pension benefit variation 
and average income variation. Although average pension benefits have had a positive 
real variation, they have been increasing less than average income for almost all the 
period since 85. The following chart represents simultaneously both variations. 
 
Graph 10: APB and income variations; Source: Pordata 
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This analysis is still too superficial to be conclusive. To further analyse the variables 
the first step is again infer on the variables stationarity.  
After performing ADF tests on Pensions expenditure over GDP it was concluded that 
it is a non-stationary variable: In all scenarios the test failed to reject the null of unit 
root with exception of the trend stationary test with more than 3 lags (PAC and 
information criteria suggest 2 lags), see in annex. Although there was some evidence 
that the series is trend stationary detrending the series held non-stationary results. 
Therefore this evidence is not strong enough to be considered.   
To further test this hypothesis a Fourier transformation approach was made. To do so, 
the frequency was chosen followed by regression of equations 3) and 4).  
 K=1 K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 
R2 W. trend 0.9814 0.8961 0.9146 0.8960 0.8963 
R2 W/out trend 0.3958 0.1964 0.1526 0.0601 0.0429 
Table 6: Frequency determination  
Then test statistics were assessed and compared to critical values. This can be 










No trend -0,072 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Trend -1,973 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Table 7: Tests statistics and critical values for the DF test of the Fourier transformation equations 
The conclusion is clear – the variable is a unit root. Furthermore it is integrated of 
order one, as when differenced it becomes stationary.  
The same analysis was made regarding benefits over GDP pc. Again K was set as 1 










No trend -3.001 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Trend -2,881 -4.69 -4.10 -3.82 Unit Root 
Table 8: Tests statistics and critical values for the DF test of the Fourier transformation equations 
So a positive shock in benefits over GDP per capita and in total expenditure over 
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GDP will have permanent effects respectively.  
It is dangerous to draw conclusions from these results regarding income growth 
“theory”; nevertheless some things can be said: Average income has grown more than 
average pension benefits and GDP pc has followed a somewhat similar path as 
benefits. Is it possible that the relation between SSEP and GDP can be a result of 
purely demographic changes and not income growth per se? Actually the following 
inequalities indicate that income growth “theory” has a demographic basis: 
 5) ΔGDP < Δ(Total Expenditure)  
Given past reasoning (Total expenditure≈ APB*Beneficiaries) and a simple 
linearization one can simplify:  
 6) Δ(Total Expenditure)  ≈ Δ(APB*Beneficiaries) ≈ ΔAPB + ΔBeneficiaries 
Therefore: 
 7) ΔGDP < ΔAPB + ΔBeneficiaries 
If ΔGDP > ΔAPB, then income increased more than benefits and the relation GDP 
over total expenditure has increased so much on account of ΔBeneficiaries. 
Calculating these variations between 1974 and 2011 the equation above can be 
translated in:  
 8) 2,35 < 1,47 + 2,78 
In fact GDP has increased more than APB. Although policy makers should be careful 
so as to revert the increasing tendencies of SSEP over GDP, there is evidence that this 
relationship is explained simply by demographic changes in Portugal.  
5.3 – Income distribution 
Tabellini’s SS model concludes that “The size of the social security program is larger 
i) the greater is the proportion of retired individuals in the population; and ii) the 
greater is the inequality of pre-tax income”. In his 90’s paper, Tabellini used cross-
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country comparison, (panel data) to prove his theory. In this case, as the focus will be 
set on the Portuguese case, only time series data will be used.  
Unfortunately data availability of inequality measures is very limited in Portugal and 
only data from 19855 onwards was found. To measure inequality the post tax Gini 
index was used. This index varies from 0 to 1 where 0 represents a scenario when all 
wages are equal and 1 when one person has all the income and the remainder 
population has nothing. So when this indicator increases so does inequality and one 
should expect an increase in the real average pension value. When analysing the chart 
one can see that the variables share a positive tendency.  
 
Graph 11: APB Gini Index     Table 9: Correlation table 
Source: Pordata and author calculations 
Furthermore, this tendency is also observable in the correlation table on the right. 
Actually Gini index is positively correlated with total pension expenditure and 
average benefits. This does not mean that the relation between these variables is not a 
spurious one – that is, although they follow a similar time path they do not have a 
casual relation.  
We have seen that average benefits is integrated of order one. Furthermore Gini Index 
and proportion of old people are also I~(1) variables, tests can be found in annex. 
Regular regression analysis is therefore off the table; to properly study these variables 
one should use first differences even though this would lead to a great amount of 
information loss. However if the variables have a cointegration relationship, there is a 
meaningful long-term relation among the variables and not a spurious one.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Rodrigues, C; Rodrigues R; Junqueira V. 2010. “Desigualdade económica em Portugal”, Fundação 
Manuel dos Santos And Pordata, also from the same fundação 
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A cointegration relationship exists when the residuals of a linear combination among 
variables with the same integration order are stationary. This can be seen as the long 
run structural relationship among variables.  
The most common test for cointegration is the Engel Granger approach. If we have a 
balance regression one should first run it by OLS and preserve the residuals. Then test 
the residuals for unit roots that is, using an Augmented Dickey Fuller test to check 
whether they are stationary or not. If the null is rejected then there is a cointegration 
relationship among the variables. It is important to notice that, as the variable to be 
tested is an estimated time series the usual critical values for the ADF do not apply. In 
the present paper critical values estimated by James G. MacKinnon6 will be used. 
Even with a cointegration relationship the validity of long-run relationships may be 
questioned, as standard econometric inference may not apply: in the long run first 
differences are expected to be zero, differencing will yield no long-run solution. In 
order to meaningfully incorporate a long-run relationship in a I(0) regression, one can 
include an error correction term in any dynamic model. This term will be the 
estimated residuals in the Engel Granger cointegration test. Using this we have an 
Error Correction Model (ECM), that allows to study the short and long run dynamics 
of the series. 
Having only 27 observations it is not possible to include many variables in the model. 
Furthermore this restricts the analysis considerably: even though several 
econometricians advocate that the frequency is not as relevant as time spam, a time 
spam of 27 years is considerably short and these test results should be taken lightly. 
Su Zhou, (2001) predicts that frequency can improve the power of the test, 
compensating in some way the lack of long-term information. Nevertheless, although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 MacKinnon, James. 2010. “Critical Values for Cointegration Tests”. Queen’s Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 12 
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the data in this case is annual and the conclusions are limited, an attempt to study this 
relationship was made using standard econometric approaches.  
Assuming that inequality cannot influence age distribution, (at least directly), this 
analysis will be made by a comparison with average benefits, as it is the only channel 
for it to influence SSEP size. Furthermore proportion of old people will influence 
total expenditure by age distribution, but it is of interest to understand if it has a direct 
influence on average benefits. This analysis will therefore be limited to three 
variables: average benefits, gini index and proportion of old people in the population. 
The first step is to run the regression:  
9) Benefits t = B0 + B1Gini t + B2Prop_old t + u 
Then estimate the residuals u:  
10) û = Benefits t - B0 - B1Gini t - B2Prop_old t 
And perform Dickey Fuller test with James G. MacKinnon critical values for 
cointegration. The following table summarizes the tests:  
Residuals Test Statistic 1% 5% 10% Conclusion 
Constant -1.2830299 -3.9001  -3.3377  -3.0462  Unit Root 
Trend -1.176489471 -4.3266   -3.7809  -3.4959 Unit Root  
Table 10: Cointegration test for Average benefits, gini index and proportion of old people 
There is no evidence of cointegration between the 3 variables. Nevertheless it is still 
possible to have this long-term relationship between Gini index and average benefits. 
The previous exercise was then duplicated using only these 2 variables. Again there 
was no evidence of cointegration:  
Residuals Test Statistic 1% 5% 10% Conclusion 
No constant 0.132691225 -2.5658  -1.9393   -1.6156  Unit Root 
Constant 0.190793307  -3.4336   -2.8621  -2.5671 Unit Root 
Trend -1.414016794 -3.9638   -3.4126  -3.1279  Unit Root  
 Table 11: Cointegration test for Average benefits and gini index 
Given this scenario ECM cannot be performed. Furthermore the fact that there is no 
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cointegration relationship between the variables suggests that they are not causal 
variables. But again these results are not final as the time spam is insufficient.   
To further analyse this, the normal step would be to analyse the variables in a 
multivariate scenario, this would fall in the scope of Johansen maximum likelihood 
method. Although it would be interesting to attempt an estimate of a cointegrating 
vector (any vector that multiplied by a set of variables yield stationary results) in this 
case it is believed that there is not sufficient information to do a satisfactory analysis 
and therefore none of that sort will be attempted. 
One more attempt was made to test this theory: the Granger causality test. The test 
can be defined as a predictive causality test: the underlying question is whether one 
variable is a good fit for forecasting purposes. Again note that data limitations shorten 
the scope of conclusions. A bivariate Vector autoregressive model was run and the 
optimal lag length was set as 1. 
Output tables can be found in annex.  
Each row of the table represents a 
Wald test with null that the coefficients of the lagged variable on “excluded” column 
are zero. The “equation” column represents the dependent variables. In this case all 
tests fail to reject the null and therefore gini index does not appear to Granger cause 
average pension benefits. 
No statistical support was found to prove income distribution theory. It appears that 
although APB follows the same path as Gini index they do not have a significant 
causal relationship. 
6 – Conclusion  
The purpose of this Project was to identify which Public choice theories better 
contribute to explain the Portuguese SS expenditure. This understanding is crucial to 
Table 12: Granger Causality test 
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better comprehend which solutions to the Social Security problem would better fit its 
reality. 
So, as to resolve this problem, one (or several) of the following should happen: a high 
enough increase in birth rates in order to shift demographic tendencies; significant 
productivity increase; increase in SS contributions rate; APB reduction; increase in 
retirement age and/or Social Security privatization, (that could only be politically 
achieved with high levels of public debt). Not only are most of these solutions 
impossible to implement, (as they are a result of many factors over which policy 
making has no or little power to influence), some of the outcomes of this solutions are 
not transparent. 
Turner’s theory states that the increase of the dependency ratio would lead to an 
increase of total SSEP, but this impact would be softened by the decrease of Average 
Pension Benefits. Nonetheless this model had no statistical support, as there is no 
evidence that old age dependency ratio has a negative impact on Average Pension 
Benefits over Income: both share an upward tendency. This implies that population 
ageing, at least until this point, has had only a positive impact on SSEP. 
Income growth “theory” points out that income growth leads to a more than 
proportional increase of SSEP. As a consequence productivity increase would have a 
dual effect: on one hand it would led to an expansion of SS revenues but total 
expenditures would also increase. However it appears that, in Portugal, this statistical 
relationship has as basis population ageing. This means that considerable productivity 
gains would have much more impact in SS finances than it would given the existence 
of such causal relationship. 
In the scenario that income distribution theory applies in Portugal, people would value 
not only intragenerational but also intergenerational redistribution. In the case of an 
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empowerment of the Social Security third pillar for instance, intergenerational 
redistribution losses would hold increased opportunity costs. Nonetheless, distribution 
is not one more obstacle to privatization, as no statistical relationship between 
inequality and APB was found. 
From the hypothesis studied, demographic shifts appears to be the sole contributor to 
the increase of expenditure with pensions, and therefore policies directed to this 
problem should be implemented and strengthened.  
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